AhlulBayt News Agency: Following the recent developments in eastern and Northern Syria, reports suggest that hundreds and even thousands of ISIS prisoners broke free from prisons controlled by the Kurdish forces. This terrorists prison break comes as both Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the interim Syrian government trade blames for the mass escape. This has not only caused an immediate security crisis, but also indicate that ISIS is becoming a political and military play card between the Kurds and the government of Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. The play with this card risks return of serious takfiri terrorism not only to Syria but also to the whole region, and particularly Iraq.
ISIS prisoners, guarding responsibility, and earlier warnings
After ISIS was defeated in Syria and Iraq in 2017, thousands of its members and supporters were sent to several prisons on Syria's north and east. The most important of these prisons was Al-Shaddadi, south of Hasakah province, which according to Kurdish resources, had been holding about 1,500 ISIS members.
Beyond Al-Hasakah, other detention sites exist, such as the prison in Ain Issa and several large camps holding families linked to ISIS fighters. For years, the primary responsibility for guarding and administering these facilities has fallen to the SDF, a group predominantly composed of Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). Backed by the US-led international coalition, these forces have shouldered the daunting task of containing this human ticking bomb.
For years, local officials in the autonomous administration of north and east Syria, as well as international bodies like the UN, have warned that these prisons are a ticking time bomb. Plagued by severe overcrowding, chronic understaffing, and constant security threats, the facilities have been viewed as a grave risk. Experts repeatedly cautioned that any new wave of conflict or a reduction in international focus and support for the SDF could trigger a mass breakout, potentially reviving ISIS's terror networks. The persistent political and military instability in the region has left these prisons both vulnerable targets and potential pawns in larger power struggles.
Political predicament: Have Kurds sent ISIS to the battleground?
In its statement, the Syrian army said it holds the SDF fully responsible for the escape of the ISIS inmates from Al-Shaddadi prison, vowing measures to regain stability and control over the region.
Some motivations can be enumerated for the Kurdish facilitation or negligence helping ISIS prison break. According to one scenario, after Bashar al-Assad’s fall, the Kurds of Syria have found themselves in predicament. After al-Assad was toppled by al-Jolani’s fighters later in 2024, Syrian home dynamics and outlook underwent important changes, causing gradual challenges to the Kurds who in previous years had managed to, with the US and Western support, gain control over one-third of the northern and northeastern Syria and establish an autonomous rule.
The fall of Assad and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's (HTS) takeover of Damascus, which declared its full readiness to cooperate with the US on advancing White House regional policies, particularly ensuring the security of the Israeli regime and confronting the Iran-led Axis of Resistance, fundamentally altered Washington's plans for Syria. American policy pivoted toward deeper cooperation with Turkey in the Syrian theater. Consequently, US representatives began pushing for an agreement to integrate Kurdish forces with the central government in Damascus.
In March 2025, through American mediation, an agreement was signed between Mazlum Abdi, commander of the SDF, and HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. The deal was meant to outline a process for merging Kurdish militia units, handing over administration of northern regions to the central government, and preserving Syria's territorial integrity.
Throughout this period, Turkey, as a key foreign ally of al-Jolani's rule and a stakeholder with a significant military footprint in northern Syria, applied external pressure. Ankara threatened military action if the Kurds failed to adhere to the agreement by the end-of-2025 deadline, opening another front against Kurdish forces.
However, nearly a year after the pact was inked, it remains unimplemented due to profound disagreements between the Kurds and the al-Jolani government. Sticking points include Kurdish demands for a comprehensive rewrite of the Syrian constitution with the participation of all minorities, the preservation of the local structure of the YPG militia, which numbers in the tens of thousands, and the division of oil revenues. This deadlock has now erupted into repeated, sporadic military clashes in Aleppo's Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood and several areas west of the Euphrates.
The Kurds now find themselves in a perilous bind: facing simultaneous military pressure from Turkey and al-Jolani's forces, while watching their traditional US support erode as Washington draws closer to Damascus and Ankara. Under these conditions, they are being forced not only to retreat from their controlled areas in Raqqa, Aleppo, and west of the Euphrates but also to relinquish the oil revenues of Deir ez-Zor. Their aspiration for maintaining any form of future autonomy in Syria's political equation appears to be slipping away.
In such situation, activation of ISIS sleeper cells in Syria through mass escape of takfiri militants from the prisons can provide a breathing space for the Kurds, since ISIS revival will disturb the Washington-eyed stability in Syria, and having in mind that the al-Jolani’s government has agreed to join the US-led Western coalition for so-called fight against ISIS, amid the Washington’s doubt about candid Syrian cooperation with counterterrorism campaign, the US army will likely return to cooperation with the Kurds.
From another perspective, confronting ISIS elements and Salafi-jihadist groups in general presents a major challenge for al-Jolani. A significant portion of the forces under his command hold extremist ideologies, and the idea of fighting alongside Americans against those who were once their allies and ideological brethren is not only difficult for them but could be considered religiously forbidden. Al-Jolani's policies of aligning with the US and the Israeli regime have already eroded trust among the hardline factions within his ranks. A stark indicator of this was the recent machine-gun attack by a member of Jolani's forces on a meeting of American military commanders at a Palmyra base, which resulted in American casualties.
This perspective likely finds sympathy among some SDF leadership as well. A resurgence by ISIS, aimed at organizational revival and territorial capture in certain areas, could divert the immediate pressure from al-Jolani's forces and Turkey. These actors would be compelled to allocate a portion of their resources to counter the fresh threat posed by ISIS.
Therefore, it is possible the Kurds, through a calculated and deliberate lapse in prison security, may have sought to engineer a controlled security crisis. The objective would be to shift the balance of power in their favor and force the US back to the negotiating table on their terms.
A pretext for advances: ISIS crisis and al-Jolani’s opportunity to seize Eastern Euphrates
On the other side, the al-Jolani’s government can take military and political advantages of the ISIS inmates escape from prison. Damascus official narrative is that the SDF is responsive for the prison break and that the army has taken measures to cleanse the region and recapture the prisoners. But a deeper analysis reveals possible al-Jolani government's motivations.
1. Assuring radicals of its forces: Many of combat forces of al-Jolani are still holding takfiri thoughts and consider the ISIS inmates former mujahideen. Freedom of these prisoners can ease their discontentment with open cooperation of al-Jolani with the US and the Israeli regime and draw their loyalty.
2. Using ISIS military potentials against ISIS: Freed ISIS elements could be utilized as an unofficial strike force against Kurdish-controlled regions. This comes especially as the Kurds, over recent years, have successfully mobilized extensive militias and secured heavy and semi-heavy weaponry. Reports even suggest that they have managed to recruit a significant number of former Syrian army personnel who are jobless and in hiding. As a result, they have bolstered their defensive capabilities against the threats posed by the al-Jolani’s government and Turkey.
In this context, Farhad Shami, director of the Media Center of SDF, announced that al-Jolani-affiliated groups have released all ISIS prisoners from a specific prison.
According to him, the freed ISIS fighters have joined certain armed groups affiliated with Damascus and plan to attack the city of Hasakah from five different fronts.
This development not only weakens the Kurdish forces but also absolves the al-Jolani government of direct involvement in the ensuing conflict. The report from the SDF media director about the defectors joining Damascus-affiliated groups and their plans for an attack on Hasakah can be interpreted within this framework.
3. Justifying military buildup: Clashing with ISIS and the ensuing chaos has given al-Jolani’s government a legal and security excuse to amass its forces in Eastern Euphrates regions, which earlier were under exclusive control of the SDF. This can be a step towards integration of the merger, this time with al-Jolani’s terms.
Conclusion and future risks
Mass ISIS prisoners' break from Al-Shaddadi prison is not just a security failure, but an alarming sign of takfiri terrorism becoming a tool in the dangerous power game in northern Syria. Whether the Kurds have facilitated the escape to shift the balance in their favor and regain Western support, or the al-Jolani’s government has acted to assure its forces and gain military advantage, the outcome remains the same: Return of ISIS specter to the region.
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